What stands out about Hegel as a philosopher is the confusion that surrounds his most basic positions. No other philosopher in the Western tradition occasions such wild divergence with regard to the principal concerns of her or his philosophy, and the competition is not even close. To capture the immensity of the divergence of opinion concerning Hegel, one would have to imagine some readers of Marx seeing him as a champion of the capitalist system rather than its foremost opponent or envision psychoanalysts conceiving of Freud as an advocate of repression rather than its diagnostician. Though there is disagreement over the details of the philosophies of Marx, Freud, and most other major thinkers, a general agreement exists concerning the fundamental principles. The same cannot be said in the case of Hegel.
Rose believes that Hegel's conception of the absolute provides an opening to radical social change, while Kojève thinks it connotes a decisive endpoint. Even though Deleuze is critical of what he considers the Hegelian position to be, he more or less agrees with Kojève on the content of that position. Though other philosophers induce conceptual quarrels among their adherents, no one has the wide variation of views attributed to her or him that Hegel does. The inability of thinkers following in his wake to come to even the broadest consensus about his philosophical project is perhaps its salient feature, and this demands attention from anyone concerned with that project.
Slavoj Žižek has spent a great deal of time in his books devoted to Hegel to correcting the history of misreading and cutting through the confusion. One might even say that Žižek's own philosophical project is intrinsically linked to the reclaiming of the Hegelian legacy and to establishing a new understanding of Hegel's principal ideas. In Absolute Recoil, Žižek claims that "the idea that Hegel simply closes his system with the mirage of total knowledge about everything there is to know, somehow bringing the entire universe to its completion, is completely wrong: what Hegel calls Absolute Knowledge is his name for a radical experience of self-limitation."
1 Rather than being a philosopher of closure and endings (as he is for both Kojève and Deleuze), Hegel becomes a thinker of opening and new beginnings under Žižek's lens. This reformulation of the received wisdom on Hegel that Žižek (along with Catherine Malabou, Rebecca Comay, and others) works out completely rewrites the traditional image of Hegel.
2 But Žižek's intervention raises a question that Žižek himself never broaches: Why did nearly two centuries pass before someone was able to penetrate the predominant caricature of Hegel's thought and make proper sense of what he was saying?
In order to understand Hegel correctly, we must examine the source of the misunderstanding. The failure to nail down the basic features of Hegel's philosophy cannot simply be the fault of two centuries of poor interpreters. Many of the greatest thinkers of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries devoted considerable time to interpreting Hegel, and the results in almost every case were doleful. Marx sees in Hegel someone who envisions the subject's complete appropriation of objectivity at the point of absolute knowledge, while Søren Kierkegaard views him as a philosopher who reduces the singular individual to the objectivity of the system. In the twentieth century, Martin Heidegger interprets Hegel's philosophy as the absolute imposition of subjectivity on being, and for Jean-Paul Sartre, Hegel is a philosopher of mutual recognition. The misreading of Hegel stretches so far among so many different types of thinkers that it goes beyond poor interpretation.
